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FARE WELL MADISON A VENUE 
MarciA. Hamilton* 
The myth is that the First Amendment constructs the mar-
ketplace of ideas and expression.' Standing behind the Supreme 
Court's free speech jurisprudence like the shadow behind Alfred 
Hitchcock (always there and always substantial),2 though, are the 
Court's copyright decisions. They have done more to affect the 
marketplace than the free speech decisions/ which, if one be-
comes very serious about the jurisprudence, actually chart the 
ways in which government is at liberty to suppress speech. The 
momentous copyright decision that ought to be erased is Justice 
Holmes' Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,4 a decision, I 
realize, few constitutional law scholars have read. They should. 
In Bleistein, the Court addressed what might seem like a 
mundane question to us today: whether a circus poster is cov-
ered by the copyright statute. The Court said, "Yes," and now 
bears the blame for turning Madison Avenue into a superpower, 
for million-dollar Super Bowl commercials with frog superstars, 
and for the mess some refer to as the Global Information Infra-
structure (or, if they are feeling really smart and want to impress 
someone, the "GII").5 Bubbling underneath the decision (in the 
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briefs) was a debate the Court elided to our detriment. The par-
ties debated whether the Constitution's Copyright Clause, which 
appears in Article I, clause 8, section 8, could cover a mere ad-
vertisement. The poster creator (predictably) argued that post-
ers are creative enough to be copyrightable while the poster us-
ers (predictably) argued that the posters were merely functional, 
and therefore couldn't be copyrightable. Justice Holmes "dealt" 
with the constitutional arguments as follows: 
We shall do no more than mention the suggestion that paint-
ing and engraving unless for a mechanical end are not among 
the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered 
by the Constitution to promote. The Constitution does not 
limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily 
needs.6 
Nice try, but the "useful arts" term mentioned in the Copy-
right Clause is referring to inventions, not writings, and nobody 
has ever argued that "bodily needs" have anything whatsoever 
to do with copyrightability. The dissent was much more on tar-
get when it said that the poster had "no other use than that of a 
mere advertisement, and no value aside from this function, [and 
therefore] it would not be promotive of the useful arts, within 
the meaning of the constitutional provision."7 
The real question in the case was whether writings that are 
more functional than not can be protected under the Constitu-
tion and therefore those who own them can sue others who copy 
them. By winging the question, the Court opened the door to 
copyright protection for a mind-numbing list of what we now call 
"cultural" products and accordingly hang or display in our living 
rooms, for example, posters of Valvoline, Vaseline, and air-
planes, not to mention B movies. It set the stage for the Court's 
meandering commercial speech doctrine, with its assumption 
that advertising speech is valuable speech. It also ensured that 
Madison A venue would become a magnet for wealth, capable of 
charging a company that actually contributes products to the 
economy millions of dollars for taking pictures of those products. 
So, let's erase it (or at least flip it so the Bleistein dissent be-
comes the majority). 
Information Infrastructure, 42 J. Copyright Soc'y 318 (1995). 
6. 8/eistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
7. Jd at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Courier Lithographing Co. v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993,996 (1900)). 
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It is 1903, and there is no copyright protection in advertise-
ments because they are functional, not art. First, Madison Ave-
nue remains the name of a thoroughfare in New York, never be-
coming an insiders' nickname for the advertising industry and its 
"admen." Without the river of money being poured into Madi-
son A venue, imagemakers do not become kingmakers. Political 
campaigns are not taken over by advertising but rather remain 
mildly boring but informative. People like Abraham Lincoln, 
unphotogenic and humble with nary a clue about managing their 
"image," continue to have a chance at being President. When 
your child says, "I want to be President someday," you can beam 
instead of making an immediate appointment with your family 
psychiatrist. 
Without Bleistein, our art museums are much purer as well. 
Much of modern art can be blamed on Bleistein. Who thought 
of saying that the functional could be artistic first? Holmes or 
Duchamp? The idea for turning a urinal into art is right there 
between the lines of Bleistein. The same can be said about car 
bumpers, baby bottles, and Campbell's Soup can labels. 
Best of all, we would not have been cursed with living in a 
time called "The Information Era." There would have been no 
doubt when computer software appeared from the primordial 
Industrial Age glop that it was functional, not a "literary work." 
There would be no cases referring to the "look and feel" of 
computer software (a scary concept all on its own)8 or its dissec-
tion, dessication, and racionation (or whatever the Altai court 
proposed in place of "look and feel").9 I would not have had to 
write a copyright article that included a section explaining what a 
"data structure" is.10 
If Bill Gates or any other computer pioneer wanted to make 
billions of dollars on computer software, he would have had to 
make the case for its propertization from the ground up, instead 
of being able to piggyback onto the preexisting copyright system. 
Before these companies were worth billions of dollars and capa-
ble of taking over 52% of intelligent life on this earth, they 
would have had to chase down our nation's lawmakers, persuade 
them to write laws that would yield them billions (without hav-
8. Sec Whelan Assocs. v. las/ow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3rd Cir. 
1986). 
9. Sec Computer Assocs. lnt'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
10. Sec Marci A. Hamilton and Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts in Copy-
right Cases: The Path to a Coherent Law, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 239, 252 (1997). 
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ing billions for lobbying to get the billions, a barrier to entry if 
there ever was one), and write testimony that would explain why 
a guy with a torn t-shirt who has not showered in a week and 
who eats stale Ritz crackers three meals a day, but who just 
wrote a computer program, needs at least a million dollars to be 
prodded to write another one. 
Only because of Bleistein does Wall Street see the following 
equation: the Internet = $$$$$. If programs were not copy-
rightable, the "suits" never would have become interested in the 
hackers' activity or the Internet in the first place, and it would 
still be a free-for-all run by hackers who don't care about money 
because no one has explained to them yet how money works and 
why it is desirable. But for Justice Holmes' decision in Bleistein, 
Vice President AI Gore could not be claiming today to be the fa-
ther of the Internet, because it wouldn't exist. (Or if he did, we 
would have real cause to wonder what was wrong with him.) 
Cyberspace would be groovy, not blue chip, and certainly not a 
tool for selling Beanie Babies. The top law schools would con-
tinue to treat copyright as a form of entertainment ambulance-
chasing, and U.S. News and World Report would never think of 
ranking "intellectual property" programs. In fact, if this were 
not the "information era," U.S. News might not bother ranking 
graduate schools and their programs at all. 
Copyright law could have continued to grapple with its own 
problems, without having to take on the computer confusion. 
Computer law would have been forced to evolve as an inde-
pendent, sui generis legal system. This alone would be worth the 
erasure. 
I have not yet arrived at the most impressive gain from 
erasing Bleistein from the books: The Disney Imperial Dynasty 
would be washed from history and replaced with an interesting 
historical figure, Walt Disney, who had a flair for drawing mice 
with clothes on. As soon as the Disney company transformed its 
creative holdings (two mice, a duck, and two rather drunken-
looking dogs) into cash-seeking missiles, they would have lost 
the quality that made them copyrightable in the first place and 
become solely functional. Once they became functional, anyone 
could use them, and Disney would not hold a monopoly in those 
images. Without its monopoly, there would be no Euro-Disney, 
no Walt Disney World, no China Disney. Nor would I have had 
to take out a home equity loan to take my children on a one-
week vacation to the Imperial Kingdom. If Bleistein were erased 
from the books, I would not have had to witness on C-SP AN 
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during a channel-surfing mishap the House suspend the rules 
and enact by unanimous consent (all two present saying "aye"), 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 11 which added 
twenty extra years of protection for all copyrightable works, 
mainly because Disney lobbied like crazy to keep their images 
from falling into the public domain. 
No Madison Avenue, no Super Bowl commercial competi-
tion, no urinals in the art museums (outside of the men's rooms), 
no Global Information Infrastructure, no speculation regarding 
how much of the world Bill Gates can now take over, no Disney 
World. Don't wake me up just yet. 
II. Sec 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). 
